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ET VERBUM CARO FACTUM EST: 
AN INTRO-DUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE
An dr ew J. JA eger
“[W]onder—the essence of the philosophical life— 
is a grace: a gift from another.”
I think there is no one who has rendered worse service to 
the human race than those who have learned philosophy as 
a mercenary trade.
—Seneca1
Most people imagine that philosophy consists in delivering 
discourses from the heights of a chair, and in giving classes 
based on texts. But what these people utterly miss is the 
uninterrupted philosophy which we see being practiced 
every day in a way which is perfectly equal to itself. . . . 
Socrates did not set up grandstands for his audience and did 
not sit upon a professorial chair; he had no fixed timetable 
for talking or walking with his friends. Rather, he did 
philosophy sometimes by joking with them, or by drinking 
or going to war or to the market with them, and finally by 
1. Letters to Lucilius 108.36, quoted in Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philoso-
phy? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), xiii.
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going to prison and drinking poison. He was the first to 
show that at all times and in every place, in everything 




It is never a bad idea to begin with the commonplace. As Hei-
degger noted in the introduction to Being and Time, the obvious 
is the first thing of which one grows forgetful. Only when the 
obvious is before our eyes can we move into the familiar and 
common to discover that within it the mystical is encountered. 
It is not as though the common and familiar are mere means to 
contemplation, which we leave behind in a meaningless world 
as our minds transcend to the divine and mystical. Instead, we 
encounter the mystical by moving into the familiar. Many have 
experienced the mystical-in-the-common through those two 
events that mark the beginning and end of creaturely existence: 
life and death. No happening for a creature is more common 
and at the same time more mystical than life and death. Moving 
into the everydayness of life reveals the mystery of death, and in 
confronting the inevitability of death, the mystery of life presents 
itself to those who are watchful.
The crucial characteristics of Jesus’ parables is that they 
take off from the most common, most mundane, most 
thoroughly familiar points imaginable rather than from 
something mysterious that must be mastered like a 
crossword puzzle. No such puzzles confront us at all; 
instead, a coin or a sheep has been lost. . . .
 When he chooses to use something mundane and 
familiar for that purpose [communicating something 
marvelous about himself ], why should it inspire a 
comparison? Because the familiar itself carries something 
unfamiliar and marvelous within it.3
2. Whether a Man Should Engage in Politics When He Is Old 26.796d, quoted 
in Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, 38.
3. Hans Urs von Balthasar, You Have the Words of Eternal Life (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1991), 137.
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Being disposed to see the marvelous by moving into the 
familiar is one of the fundamental philosophical dispositions. The 
pre-Socratic philosophers—especially Heraclitus—emphasized 
the needfulness of listening. This is true in two senses: we need to 
learn to listen, and listening is itself a need for something. The logos 
in nature can be heard only by one who is “awake.”4 The problem 
is that most live as though they were asleep, immersed in their own 
world. Being in tune with nature opens one to hear something 
beyond nature—namely, the logos of nature. This implies a paradox: 
one can understand nature—i.e., be open to hear its logos—only if 
one is already open to hear it. The logos speaks to all, but it only 
sucessfully communcicates with its lover. The philosophical life 
is intelligible only from within an openness to the logos. In this 
essay, I will argue that living a philosophical life (i.e., a philo-logical 
life: literally, a life in love with logos) is something that one has 
always already had.5 In short, a philosophical life is not something 
that one can decide to have or not; it is essentially something that 
one is thrown into, or perhaps more accurately, something that 
one finds oneself already a part of—like being in love—as the fruit 
of an unmerited gift. The philosophical life is a life of grace, since 
it is something that is given from another. This essay sets out to 
examine the philosophical facets of the claim that the philosophical 
life is a life of grace.
1. AN APOLOGY FOR THE APOLOGY: 
BEGINNING WITH THE END
No one outside the philo-logical life can understand the philo-
logical life. It is only after pursuing logos in love that the mean-
ing and justification for doing so comes into focus. For that rea-
son, I do not intend to explain what the philosophical life is, as 
if it were something that I and the reader can both distance our-
4. See the many Heraclitus fragments in Robin Waterfield, The First Phi-
losophers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
5. In what follows, I will use the phrases “philosophical” and “philo-logi-
cal” synonymously, since their meaning as I intend them here is the same: a life 
in love with logos, which is a life in erotic pursuit of wisdom. Socrates notes in 
the Symposium that no philosopher should be called wise, since the philosopher 
is not wisdom but its lover.
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selves from to examine as a medical examiner studies a cadaver. 
Hoping to understand the philosophical life from a “neutral” and 
“objective” vantage point is, ipso facto, to place oneself outside of 
the only possible means of justifying it, which as we said comes 
from living it. To treat the philo-logical life in this “objective” 
manner is to examine it in a state of ignorance. To do so is akin 
to the psychologist who wants to know what human love is, and 
so supposes that he must not make himself fall in love, since this 
will color his perspective on the true nature of love. He would be 
studying love under a microscope, and he thinks that to really see 
love for what it is he must see it from the outside. To inquire into 
love in this way is to study it from the standpoint of ignorance. 
In fact, inquiring in this way into an essential mystery like love is 
the height of irrationality; the method of his inquiry contradicts 
the nature of the subject. Therefore, the inquiry fails before it 
even begins.
Alternatively, we propose in this essay the broad contours 
of the Platonic method of inquiry through which one enters the 
philo-logical life. This essay has just as much a descriptive thesis 
as it does a “performative” one. It constitutes an intro-duction 
(literally, an “intro-duction” is a leading into something) to phi-
losophy, which, if successful, will lead the reader closer to living 
a life in love of the logos. After filling out a few details regard-
ing what a Platonic intro-duction to philosophy is, I conclude this 
section with an outline of how this intro-duction will unfold 
throughout the essay.
An intro-duction to philosophy must be both a descrip-
tive and a performative endeavor, such that without the success 
of the latter, the former withers into mere shadows on a wall, 
concealing the nature of the philosophical life rather than dis-
closing it. To be introduced to the philosophical life one must be, 
as they say, “all in.” Peter Strawson has stated that “there is no 
shallow end to the philosophy pool.”6 In short, an intro-duction to 
the philosophical life (which is true of all lives of love) requires a 
6. Peter Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), vii. Strawson’s meaning is that an introduction to philosophy is not 
the same thing as an easy philosophy. All philosophy—especially when one is 
being introduced to it—is in many ways painful and difficult. Recall Plato’s 
description of the freed prisoner, who first begins to orient himself toward the 
light and is thereby in a state of intense pain.
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baptism that consists in a complete immersion.
Let me begin with a brief word as to why a Platonic intro-
duction to philosophy is more apt than others (not that there are 
not others) at introducing the philosophical life. We learn to live 
by watching and imitating others. Different kinds of lives—like 
any kind of craft—are learned and handed on by watching, ob-
serving, and ultimately imitating those who are living it. One 
does not learn to plane a piece of hard maple with a hand plane 
by a priori reflection or mere description; one must stay awake 
and keep watch at the workbench of the carpenter. We are in-
troduced to a life by observing it play out. Plato’s dialogues have 
shown us what the philosophical life looks like through the per-
son of Socrates. The dramatic structure of Plato’s dialogues is 
essential to Plato’s presentation of philosophy, since he is showing 
us what he cannot merely tell us: philosophy is a way of life. Just as 
one does not learn carpentry from abstract treatises, one does not 
learn philosophy from abstract treatises.
Socrates is the witness—a revelation—of what the philo-
sophical life is. This has as much to do with how he lives as it 
does with how he dies. In fact, the two cannot be separated. To 
live a philosophical life is to pursue logos in love; a philosophical 
life therefore must culminate in a philosophical death, giving up 
one’s life for that end, since there is no greater act of love than 
to die for one’s beloved. Death can be the greatest philosophical 
act, since it can be the greatest act of love. In dying one gathers 
up one’s entire life and hands it over to the beloved—in this case, 
the logos. A philosophical death amounts to gifting one’s entire 
life, with no remainder, to one’s beloved.
An intro-duction to the philosophical life properly be-
gins with a philosophical death. The drama of Socrates’s death 
will therefore be our beginning. The Apology consists of Plato’s 
account of Socrates’s defense speech against the charges levied 
against him, most notably of making the weaker argument stron-
ger and of corrupting the youth of Athens. Socrates is ultimately 
found guilty of these charges by an Athenian jury and sentenced 
to death. Subsequently, the dialogue Phaedo portrays the last few 
hours of Socrates’s life in his prison cell with his closest friends 
just before he drinks the hemlock. The end of Socrates’s life is 
the best place for one to be introduced to his way of life. In fact, 
a good number of Plato’s dialogues make explicit reference to 
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Socrates’s expectation (and almost foreknowledge) of his indict-
ment and execution for living a philosophical life. Plato seems to 
be suggesting through the person of Socrates that the philosophi-
cal life leads to death. In the Gorgias, Socrates makes just that 
observation:
I know this well: that if I do come into court involved in one 
of those perils which you mention, the man who brings me 
in will be a wicked man—for no good man would bring in 
a man who is not a wrongdoer—and it wouldn’t be at all 
strange if I were to be put to death. (521d)7
Plato’s dialogues appear to have Socrates’s death on ev-
ery page. In a sense, it is his death that leads him onward in his 
conversation, like a lamp in a cave as one journeys toward the 
sun. In the Phaedo, Socrates goes so far as to assert that his entire 
life has been oriented toward his death. It is here that my apol-
ogy for beginning with Plato’s Apology is rooted. Socrates’s death 
lies always before his eyes, guiding his pursuit of logos. It is his 
death that unifies his life. Therefore, arriving at a clear view of 
Socrates’s death allows one to begin to make sense of his rather 
mystifying life.8
I want to make my argument before you, my judges, as 
to why I think that a man who has truly spent his life in 
philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face 
of death and to be very hopeful that after death he will 
attain the greatest blessings yonder. . . . I am afraid that 
other people do not realize that the one aim of those who 
practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for 
7. Throughout this essay, all references to Plato’s works are from John Coo-
per, ed., The Complete Dialogues of Plato (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 
1997).
8. Plato, Sophist 354a–b (emphasis added): “Visitor: We’ll find that the 
philosopher will always be in a location like this if we look for him. He’s hard 
to see clearly too, but not in the same way as the sophist.
Theaetetus: Why not?
Visitor: The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not, which 
he’s had practice dealing with, and he’s hard to see because the place is so dark. 
Isn’t that right?
Theaetetus: It seems to be.
Visitor: But the philosopher always uses reasoning to stay near the form, 
being. He isn’t at all easy to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of 
most people’s souls can’t bear to look at what’s divine.”
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dying and death. Now if this is true, it would be strange 
indeed if they were eager for this all their lives and then 
resent it when what they wanted and practiced for a long 
time comes upon them.9
In the Apology, Socrates is charged by two different 
groups of accusers: those who have been accusing him his entire 
life and those who have only recently made accusations against 
him. Socrates recognizes that the accusations of this “newer” 
group—spearheaded by the young Meletus—are not as “danger-
ous” as the accusations of the older group. The reason he gives 
for this evaluation is quite telling:
It is right for me, gentlemen, to defend myself first against 
the first lying accusations made against me and my first 
accusers. There have been men who have accused me to 
you for many years now, and none of their accusations are 
true. These I fear much more . . . they got hold of most of 
you from childhood, persuaded you and accused me quite 
falsely, saying that there is a man called Socrates, a wise 
man, a student of all things in the sky and below the earth, 
who makes the worse argument the stronger.10
What is on trial in the Apology is the whole of Socrates: not simply 
an action he did or an aspect of his life, but his whole life, his way 
of being in the world. For this reason, no one should read the Apolo-
gy thinking that Socrates is defending just himself. Nothing could 
be farther from the truth. Socrates’s life reveals that his life is not 
his own. Remember, Socrates is a witness to a way of living, and 
it is that way of living, and not merely the witness himself, that is 
placed on trial. Therefore, Socrates’s apology is on behalf of that 
way of living, that way of loving logos. Plato masterfully puts 
logos itself on trial through the condemnation of its most erotic 
lover, Socrates. Socrates witnesses to something more than him-
self—the truth—and so his life stands for something more than 
itself. For this reason “the life of Socrates” is more than the life 
of a mere individual man, and the trial of Socrates is more than 
9. Plato, Phaedo 63e–64a.
10. Plato, Apology 18b. It is also interesting, as we will see, that it was—ac-
cording to Socrates—actually those who spread those rumors and false ac-
cusations about him who are the real corruptors of the youth, for they are the 
haters of logos.
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the trial of an individual man. One could even say that the death 
of Socrates is more than the death of an individual man: it is the 
Athenian nihilistic precursor to the Nietzschean death of God.
Even the title of Plato’s work, ἀπολογία (apologia), could 
be understood as proposing the trial of an ἀπο-λογος (apo-logos), 
the trial of one who is “descended from” the λόγος (logos).11 
Moreover, one could interpret Socrates himself as the ἀπολογία. 
He reveals the λόγος through his love of it. The philosophic life 
is represented by Plato as the life of argument, the life of reason, 
which is the life of λόγος. In accusing Socrates, the Athenians 
were claiming that λόγος was not a coherent end of human life. 
Logos itself was on trial in persona Socratis.
In the Apology, the Athenians (who took themselves to 
know what was and was not good—i.e., to be wise) demanded 
an apology for the life of logos, and one that made sense from 
within their own non-philo-logical life. As we will see in section 3, 
demanding an apology for the philo-logical life reveals that one 
is already standing outside of logos. For such a person no logos 
could suffice since logos is its own logos. Just as no argument 
can be given proving a first principle (for, if there were, then 
that principle would not be a first principle, but founded on a 
more fundamental principle), nothing can make sense of the lo-
gos other than the logos itself. As we will explain later, what the 
Athenians demanded of Socrates during his trial is akin to the 
illiterate demanding—per impossibile—an account of language in 
terms they could understand. The persistent demand to give a 
logos that the misological could understand predisposes one to 
irrationality. It is on these grounds that Socrates was condemned 
as irrational, unwise, and ultimately corruptive. Socrates’s ratio-
nality was not the rationality of the “wise” (the sophists), and it 
was precisely for that reason that he was seen as dangerous and 
even crazy.12 Socrates’s prosecutors were asking for the impos-
11. Admittedly, this is etymologically “playful,” but the interpretation be-
ing given of Socrates does justify this play on words.
12. Cf. St. Antony of Egypt: “A time is coming when men will go mad, 
and when they see someone who is not mad, they will attack him saying, ‘you 
are mad, you are not like us’” (The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The Alphabeti-
cal Collection, trans. Benedicta Ward, SLG (London: A. R. Mowbray, 1975), 
5, quoted in Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 2nd rev. ed. [Boston: 
Cowley Publications, 1990], 94).
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sible—they wanted to understand the logos from outside—and 
therefore Socrates was guilty before he even began to speak. He 
was fully aware that his fate was set long before his trial:
There are many reasons for my not being angry with you 
for convicting me, men of Athens, and what happened was 
not unexpected.13
This is why one ought to begin with the Apology as an 
intro-duction to the life of logos. The Apology places the reader 
face to face with the fundamental question: Which life makes the 
most sense, the philo-logical life or the miso-logical life? Inter-
estingly, instead of asserting an answer outright, Plato leaves it as 
a question in the last line of the dialogue:
I go to die, you go to live. Which of us goes to the better 
lot is known to no one, except the god.14
Why Socrates leaves this question open might be ini-
tially puzzling given his confidence (in this dialogue as well as 
in the Crito and Phaedo) toward facing death as a philosopher. 
We will return to this intriguing question in section 3, where 
we will consider the meta-dialogical nature of Plato’s writing, 
but a brief word here will be helpful. Perhaps Plato leaves it an 
open question so as to lead his readers into—intro-duce—the life 
of logos. Perhaps asking that question constitutes an answer to it; 
moreover, perhaps the answer of the intelligibility of the life of 
logos is not something that can be argued for merely in words but 
needs also to be shown and participated in. No words, evidently, 
stand prior to the logos, since it is its own reason. Perhaps logos 
can only be known as received, as revealed.
Before proceeding any further, a word must be said about 
this essay by way of outline. In this section, section 1, I described 
what a Platonic intro-duction to philosophy is. The remaining 
sections attempt to show what a philosophical life is in persona Soc-
ratis, with the intent that the reader both (a) arrive at a better un-
derstanding of the philosophical life, and more importantly (b) 




of the charges levied against Socrates, emphasizing the primary 
charge that Socrates made the weaker argument the stronger. 
This discussion will carry us into section 3, which takes up the 
distinction between the philo-logic life and the miso-logic life 
(a life hateful of logos). This distinction maps nicely onto the 
distinction between philosophers and sophists. The philosophi-
cal life is a life of humility, patience, obedience, receptivity. This 
stands in contrast to the misological life of the sophist, who is 
prideful, short-tempered, controlling, and assertive. The former 
is essentially communal and dialogical while the latter is isolated 
and monological. Socrates is depicted in the Symposium as both 
the ideal lover and beloved precisely because his life reveals the 
unification of activity and passivity; he reveals love as the ac-
tive receptivity of logos. Actively preparing oneself to receive the 
logos is, therefore, the most rational act one can engage in. No 
one in history was more prepared to receive the logos—not even 
Socrates—than Mary, Seat of Wisdom. Wisdom came to her, to 
dwell in her. This was only possible by her active receptivity of 
the logos. Mary—Seat of Wisdom—is a philosopher par excellence.
Along similar lines, I will also argue that the philosophi-
cal life is a life of grace. It is not a life that one can enter through 
one’s own efforts. In the last section of this essay, section 4, I will 
examine the ways in which the philosophical life is a life that 
participates in the incarnation of the logos. The philosopher—in 
searching for logos—brings forth the presencing of logos. For 
this reason, the philosophical life finds its fulfillment in partici-
pating in the Incarnation of the Logos. As we will see later, the 
fully human life—the life of reason—finds its perfection in eroti-
cally pursuing and ultimately knowing the divine. I will argue 
that knowledge of the divine brings about a certain union with 
it, so that the human becomes most human—attains its end—
when he knows, and hence is united to, the divine. As Socrates 
himself states, although unable to grasp the full depths of what 
he says, the philosophical life is a life oriented toward deification: 
“He is divine—but then I call all philosophers that.”15
2 . MAKING THE WEAKER THE STRONGER
15. Plato, Sophist 216c.
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From the opening lines of Plato’s Apology we are confronted with 
the charges brought against Socrates, and it is precisely his very 
defense speech that constitutes the justification the jury needs 
to convict him and ultimately sentence him to death. From the 
beginning, he is seen to make the weaker argument the stronger 
and the stronger argument the weaker. In fact, what comes most 
directly into question here is what it means to be weaker. Interest-
ingly, Socrates begins his defense by praising the “strength” of 
his accusers:
I do not know, men of Athens, how my accusers affected 
you; as for me, I was almost carried away in spite of myself, 
so persuasively did they speak. And yet, hardly anything of 
what they said is true. Of the many lies they told, one in 
particular surprised me, namely that you should be careful 
not to be deceived by an accomplished speaker like me.16
So “strong” are his accusers that they even come close to per-
suading Socrates himself that he is guilty of corruption. Socrates 
concedes that his accusers’ words are undoubtedly “strong,” ef-
fective, and persuasive. “And yet, hardly anything of what they 
said is true.” So strong, yet so weak. The juxtaposition at the be-
ginning of the Apology between the “strength” of falsehood and 
the “weakness” of truth foreshadows what is to come. Despite 
the accusers’ apparent strength, “hardly anything of what they 
said is true”; the implication is that it ought not be believed. This 
leads one to ask, what counts as power or strength? What makes 
something genuinely persuasive?
Socrates puts this question to Polus in the Gorgias. He 
argues that the rhetorician, like the tyrant, might appear strong in 
one sense: he can bring about whatever he desires (under one de-
scription). However, on closer analysis, this is false. The tyrant—
like everyone—desires his own good, which he actually fails to 
bring about, by, say, willing an unjust murder, because he lacks 
the power to do what is truly good for him, namely, justice. The 
exchange between Socrates and Polus is sufficiently important on 




Hence, we don’t simply want to slaughter people, 
or exile them from their cities and confiscate their 
property as such; we want to do these things if they are 
beneficial, but if they’re harmful we don’t. For we want 
the things that are good, as you agree . . .
Polus:
I think it’s true.
Socrates:
Since we’re in agreement about that then, if a person 
who’s a tyrant or an orator puts somebody to death 
or exiles him or confiscates his property because he 
supposes that doing so is better for himself when 
actually it’s worse, this person, I take it, is doing what 




And is he also doing what he wants, if these things are 
actually bad? Why don’t you answer?
Polus:
All right, I don’t think he’s doing what he wants.
Socrates:
Can such a man possibly have great power in that city, 





So, what I was saying is true, when I said that it is 
possible for a man who does in his city what he sees 
fit not to have great power, nor to be doing what he 
wants.17
True strength is being able to do what is beneficial to you. Voli-
tionally, this amounts to willing your true good, not what merely 
appears good. Epistemically, this amounts to believing what is 
truly persuasive (i.e., what is true), and not what merely appears 
true. According to Socrates, the truly powerful person is the one 
who orders his life according to true ends. As the famous cave al-
legory suggests, the person who cannot order his life to its proper 
end, despite being a king in the cave, is a slave in reality. Return-
ing to the Apology, Socrates admits that he is weak when it comes 
to playing the games of orators. He lacks the power to convince 
17. Plato, Gorgias 468c–e.
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someone that a shadow is light. But as we have just seen, that is 
no power at all. True power lies in speaking the truth.
Of the many lies they told, one in particular surprised me, 
namely that you should be careful not to be deceived by an 
accomplished speaker like me. That they were not ashamed 
to be immediately proved wrong by the facts, when I 
show myself not to be an accomplished speaker at all, that 
I thought was most shameless on their part—unless indeed 
they call an accomplished speaker the man who speaks the truth. If 
they mean that, I would agree that I am an orator, but not 
after their manner.18
The remainder of the Apology’s intro-duction constitutes the ex-
planation for Socrates’s conviction. In the world in which the 
Athenian jury lived—the world of courts and politics—Socrates 
was imploring them to consider the weaker argument as stron-
ger. His fate, and indeed the fate of logos, was determined after 
ten sentences:
My present request seems a just one, for you to pay no 
attention to my manner of speech—be it better or worse—
but to concentrate your attention on whether what I say is 
just or not, for the excellence of a judge lies in this, as that 
of a speaker lies in telling the truth.19
Socrates was no accomplished orator, but he accomplishes some-
thing unfathomable to the Athenian jury: “What I say is true, 
gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you.”20 Socrates is turn-
ing the Athenian way of life upside down. In a sense, he is call-
ing Athens out of the darkness of the cave.21 Socrates is giving a 
revaluation of all the Athenian values: piety, knowledge, justice, 
being, beauty, love, and wisdom. Even the point of Socrates’s 
trial, down to his defense speech itself, is revaluated: “Men of 
Athens, I am far from making a defense now on my own behalf, 
18. Apology 17b–c (emphasis added).
19. Ibid., 18a.
20. Ibid., 38b.
21. Cf. Plato, Republic 514a–517a6, which is an apt allegorical representa-
tion of the scene described by Plato in the Apology.
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as might be thought, but on yours.”22
The Athenian table of values has been turned upside-
down, and the jury has been placed on trial.23 Socrates has turned 
the prosecutor into the defendant, and the accusers into the ac-
cused. This revaluation is clearly seen in book two of the Republic 
as well as in the Gorgias. Let us begin with the former. Desiring 
to see Socrates’s strongest defense for the life of justice, Glau-
con attempts to make the strongest case he can for what he calls 
the “general opinion”: the natural superiority of injustice over 
justice. Justice—according to the Athenian populace—has mere 
extrinsic or artificial value. As Glaucon explains,
They say that to do injustice is naturally good and to 
suffer injustice bad, but that the badness of suffering it so 
far exceeds the goodness of doing it that those who have 
done and suffered injustice and tasted both, but who lack 
the power to do it and avoid suffering it, decide that it is 
profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither 
to do injustice nor suffer it.24
Glaucon’s account of the common notion of justice and its ori-
gins culminates in something that appears to be taken directly 
out of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals.
People value it [ justice] not as a good but because they are 
too weak to do injustice with impunity. Someone who has 
the power to do this, however, and is a true man wouldn’t 
make an agreement with anyone not to do injustice in 
order not to suffer it. For him that would be madness.25
The man with true power is “a true man.” He is not the sort of 
man that deliberates in terms of justice or injustice. That con-
ceptual scheme is foreign to him. Glaucon is arguing that in the 
Athenian worldview, the true man—although quite rare—is be-
yond justice. Without going into the details of his response to this 
challenge, Socrates argues throughout the course of the Republic 
22. Apology 30d–e.
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(especially in books four and nine) that justice is a necessary (and 
perhaps even sufficient) intrinsic good for living a free, human—
and hence for reasons we saw at the end of section 1—a more-
than-human life. The unjust man—the Athenian “true man”—
turns out to be the weakest of men. The true man who takes 
himself to be beyond justice and obedient to no one is in fact 
dehumanized and more properly described as a beast than a man. 
Socrates’s life—the life of logos—is the antithesis to the Athenian 
“true man.” Socrates’s life (and here it is not in spite of its status 
as imprisoned but especially when it is in this condition, subject to 
the death sentence) is one of freedom, whereas the “true man’s” 
life is the life of slavery. In the eyes of many Athenians, Socrates 
is attempting to do something perverse to Athens: he is taking 
what they regard as weak and ugly—his life—and beseeching 
them to regard such a life as worthy of the rewards given to 
Olympian victors. It becomes evident what was at stake in his 
being charged with making the weaker the stronger, and why it 
would be nearly impossible for him to convince his jury that his 
way of life does not corrupt the youth of Athens but perfects them. 
Unless one is a lover of logos (a philosopher), one cannot under-
stand Socrates as anything other than a corrupter of Athens. But 
here is the rub: if general opinion inclines toward misology, then 
no apology for the philosophical life could ever be regarded as 
justified. The only possible interpretation of the life of Socrates 
for the misologist is that he is a corrupter of youth who makes 
the weaker the stronger.
Toward the end of the Gorgias, after hearing Socrates’s 
praises of justice over injustice, the sophist Callicles can remain 
silent no longer. He is so bewildered by Socrates’s praise of jus-
tice that he finds it hard to determine whether Socrates is sin-
cere, for in his ears the content of Socrates’s assertions borders 
on absurdity. “Are we to take it that you’re serious in all this,” 
he asks, “or are you having us on? You see, if you’re serious, and 
if what you’re saying really is the truth, surely human life would 
be turned upside down, wouldn’t it? Everything we do is the op-
posite of what you imply we should be doing.”26 Callicles rightly 
notes that if Socrates is taken seriously, then human life would 
be turned upside down. Socrates’s praise of reason (logos) over 
26. Gorgias 481b.
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power seems to be an appraisal of weakness over strength. In a 
charge that is reminiscent of Glaucon’s “general opinion” as well 
as Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Callicles accuses Socrates of 
making slaves masters, the weak the strong. Socratic values are 
slave values. Callicles puts it thus:
In my opinion it’s the weaklings who constitute the majority 
of the human race who make the rules. In making these 
rules, they look after themselves and their own interests, and 
that’s also the criterion they use when they dispense praise 
and criticism. They try to cow the stronger ones—which 
is to say, the ones who are capable of increasing their share 
of things—and to stop them getting an increased share, by 
saying that to do so is wrong and contemptible. . . . I think 
we only have to look at nature to find evidence that it is right 
for better people to have a greater share than worse, more 
capable than less capable. . . . I’d even go so far as to say that 
they act in conformity with natural law, even though they 
presumably contravene our man-made laws.27
Callicles’s assessment sheds light on what exactly the charge of 
making the weaker argument the stronger amounted to, and why 
the Athenian jurymen saw death as the most fitting punishment 
for a destroyer of Athenian values. It can be summed up in the 
words of Callicles: “Oh, Socrates, what a clever discovery this 
[philosophy] is. It enables you to take a naturally gifted person 
and ruin him.”28 In a sense, Callicles is right; Socrates does ruin 
“naturally” gifted people. But he ruins them in the way that the 
freed prisoner in the cave is ruined once he returns back into 
the cave, unable to succeed at the shadow games. The strong (in 
the cave) must be made weak (in the cave) if they are to become 
truly strong (in the light). So, in a sense, Socrates is trying to 
make the stronger weaker. He is trying to blind those that see, 
and to give sight to those that are blind ( Jn 9:39).
3. THE TWO LIVES: PHILOSOPHICAL OR MISOLOGICAL
The main charge levied against Socrates was that he makes the 
27. Ibid., 483c–e.
28. Ibid., 486b.
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weaker the stronger. In a very subtle way, Socrates was guilty of 
this. After all, he did—as Callicles noted—turn Athenian life up-
side down. What they regarded as weakness (i.e., logos) Socrates 
regarded as strength. The Athenian table of values was undoubt-
edly flipped; however, it is not immediately obvious whether the 
“Socratic turn” leaves the world upside-down, or right-side-up. 
This question seems to be one of the lessons of Plato’s allegory 
of the cave. But figuring out the orientation of the world, as it 
were, proves to be more difficult than one might think. But one 
thing is sure: a flip has occurred. Unless one has already made 
“the Socratic turn” to the philosophical life, one has little hope 
of understanding the goodness of such a life. Granted, the seeds 
of the Socratic life are given to us in our nature at birth, for “all 
men by nature desire to know.”29 There is always hope, but it 
diminishes to the degree that we stifle our disposition to wonder. 
Wondering at nature is like tilling the soil. It prepares the soul to 
receive logos, and as we all know, seeds will not grow on rocky 
or uncultivated soil.
The logos is its own reason, and so no one can stand 
outside of it and demand it to speak; all one would hear is either 
nothing or nonsense, which amount to the same thing.30 Only 
the lover can find meaning, since he has ears to hear and eyes to 
see. After we examine this paradox a bit more, we will return 
to the question raised earlier concerning the performative and 
meta-dialogical nature of the Platonic dialogue. In the next sec-
tion, I will argue that Plato’s dialogues reveal logos to those who 
are open to receiving it; Plato’s dialogues incarnate logos in the 
same way that Socrates’s life did.
The philo-logical life can be characterized as a life that 
is obedient to reason and hence in love with and at the service 
of it. The philo-logical life is the life of a handmaid, a servant, 
and a midwife.31 Such individuals are not principally concerned 
with themselves but with another; they conform their lives to 
another. Rationality requires not only hearing the logos, but also 
29. Aristotle, Metaphysics 980a21.
30. This is precisely the situation Pilate is in when he questions the Logos 
from outside: the only answers he receives are questions and silence.
31. Throughout the Theaetetus Socrates uses the analogy of the midwife to 
characterize the life of the philosopher.
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conforming one’s life to it, since to hear is to follow. Conformity 
to and love of one greater gives rise to a clarity of vision of that 
other: “The more obediently one thinks, the more clearly one 
sees.”32 The lover of logos yearns for union with it. This is what 
distinguishes the lover from the tyrant. The former yearns to 
conform himself to truth whereas the latter yearns to conform 
truth to himself. This is exactly why the philosopher is a lover. 
The miso-logical life, on the other hand, is a life that is insubor-
dinate to reason and hence grows hateful of reason trying to con-
trol it; it expresses this hatred by trying to fit reason completely 
within its own schema. The misologist takes reason to be the 
tyrant of truth, since reason makes the pronouncement on what 
is true rather than letting truth speak for itself. The misologist is 
the master of reason, which is in turn the master of truth, rather 
than being a lover of reason as obedient to truth. The misologist 
is irrational precisely because he takes himself to be above reason 
and its master. Therefore, the misological life is a life of pride 
because it takes itself to be not with another but above another.33
Misology is will-to-power. Misology is the death of 
God, since it leaves one receptive of nothing. It serves nothing 
except its own power. It takes logos as something to be grasped 
at. For the misologist, there is no knowledge, no meaning, no 
direction, no being, no logos. In one sense, Nietzsche appears to 
be the perfection of misology. His transvaluation of all Socratic 
value—knowledge is power; logos is power; being and meaning 
lie in becoming—strikes one as the apex of misology. However, 
Nietzsche’s great fear is that misology, precisely in its negative 
orientation toward logos, is still wedded to the reality of logos. 
Nietzsche is trying to move beyond misology. It is only when we 
grow forgetful of God in the marketplace (even forgetful of the 
“smell of the divine decomposition”) that we become free of the 
32. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. 1: Seeing the Form 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 160.
33. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. 4: The Realm of 
Metaphysics in Antiquity (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 169: “The phi-
losopher wills the truth without any conditions. . . . He therefore divides men 
into two groups: those who serve truth and pledge to it, and those who let 
truth serve them and are not pledged to it. . . . But, more deeply, this front was 
the more brutal struggle between the service of truth and the egoism of power 
for which any ideology is right if only it increases power.”
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grip of the logos. In a sense, for Nietzsche, one who has killed 
logos does not even make the appearance-reality distinction. For, 
even allowing the misologist to communicate an appearance of 
knowledge, meaning, and logos is to concede too much to real-
ity. Where there is appearance of logos there is some mysterious 
reality of logos that shines forth. The problem, as Nietzsche sees 
it, is that we cannot move beyond logos until we move beyond 
language, beyond grammar. After all, the seeds of logos are built 
into the very texture of language itself, which even Nietzsche 
recognized: “I am afraid we are not getting rid of God because 
we still believe in grammar. . .”34
Language is essentially logical; therefore, speakers of lan-
guage are inherently philo-logical. The linguistic life and hence 
the philo-logical life—like the life of love—is a life of receptiv-
ity, openness, and “listening.” The state of active receptivity is 
a necessary condition for being in love with (or even simply in 
communication and dialogue with) another. Likewise, being ac-
tively receptive to logos is a necessary condition for being united 
with (and hence of understanding) logos. Therefore, to under-
stand the philo-logical life requires one to be already living it. It 
is the same with understanding the musical life: the meaning or 
good in living a musical life is intelligible to one who is in such 
a life. Those that have never played an instrument well lack a 
genuine understanding its goodness.
Likewise, beauty is its own reason, and unless one en-
counters the beautiful one cannot understand beauty. The same 
goes for living a literate life. Obviously, it is not possible to ex-
plain the reason for being a literate human being from the out-
side—that is, from the standpoint of illiteracy. One must find 
oneself already in such a life in order to understand the mean-
ing of language. Hence, one cannot “work” one’s own way into 
understanding the musical or literate life. This goes for initially 
learning the instrument and playing previously written pieces as 
well as for creating new pieces. Those who have ever been “lost” 
in playing music (or listening to music) realize that a whole 
world is opened up for them by virtue of being musical. However, 
34. Friedrich Nietzsche, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy, #5,” in Twilight of the 
Idols, cited in The Nietzsche Reader, ed. Keith Pearson and Duncan Large (Mal-
den, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 464.
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one must be taught to be musical. Someone must con-descend 
(i.e., descend to be with us) to you who know nothing of and 
can know nothing of such a life, if there is any hope of coming 
to understand the logic or point of that life. It is only by the con-
descension of another that one can, with surprise, find oneself 
already living a life in union with its logos.
Consider the following example of how a child becomes 
capable of speech. There is nothing that the child can do on 
his own to arrive at his own language. There can be no private 
language; its essence is to be shared.35 Saying that he can master 
language on his own is nothing short of a linguistic pelagianism, 
which claims that one can come to the word through one’s own 
efforts. If the child, or anyone for that matter, is to have a lan-
guage, it must be something that one is intro-duced to (brought 
or drawn into) through the activity of another. In this light, lan-
guage becomes intelligible only as gifted or graced from another. 
However, like all gifts, a proper reception is necessary to com-
plete the act of giving. I cannot be said to have taught students if 
no one learned. Therefore, one cannot be forced into learning a 
language (any more than one can be forced into an education); 
the child must willingly follow the linguistic speaker into the 
language. So, both the child and his parent are each responsible, 
albeit in different ways, for the child to learn a language. No one 
can stand outside a language and understand it. No one can stand 
outside of beauty, justice, or love and understand them, any more 
than one can stand outside language and understand it. Finally, 
no one can stand outside of logos and hope to understand it. 
Logos is intelligible only when heard in love, which means in 
union.
The fundamental, originary experience of every human 
being is that of gift: finding oneself already in existence, which 
one has done nothing—nor could do anything—to merit.36 This 
is recapitulated in the way we find ourselves as already linguistic 
35. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language in 
Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), §243ff.
36. For superb metaphysical reflections on this originary experience of 
gift as the foundation for metaphysics and epistemology, see Antonio López, 
Gift and the Unity of Being (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014); and Kenneth 
Schmitz, The Gift: Creation (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982).
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humans. The only fitting response for someone who finds him-
self always already in a life of being, language, beauty, or logos is 
one of gratitude. The entrance into these “lives”—that is, a life of 
language, beauty, logos, being, and such things—is first and fore-
most the result of an initial gift or grace from another. The life of 
logos (as it is for one’s very being) must come to us if we are to 
live it; we cannot go to it. If one sees or hears or understands the 
reason internal to such lives, one can be certain that another has 
con-descended for our sake, enabling us to see what we would 
not otherwise have seen, hear what we would not otherwise have 
heard, understand that which would otherwise have remained 
incomprehensible, and ultimately love that which we otherwise 
would have hated.
The philosophical life is made actual by the grace of 
living it. One might be worried—and this is a legitimate con-
cern—that the thesis just stated collapses the distinction between 
nature and grace. If reason is actualized by the grace of another, 
then it does not seem natural for man to be rational, since reason 
would come from the “outside” and not be an internal principle 
of man.37 In short, man’s nature would not be natural, and so 
not a nature. Before continuing, it will be fruitful to address this 
worry, since doing so will help to clarify the meaning of our 
thesis.
It is impossible for there to be any competition in prin-
ciple between nature and grace, just as it is impossible for there 
to be any competition between language and grace. Classically, 
man had been defined as the living creature of reason or language: 
ζῷον λόγον ἔχον. Man is the linguistic, rational, or logos-having 
37. In conversation, Aaron Riches raised the following related worry: In 
light of this characterization of the philosophical life as steeped in grace, what 
accounts for the radical newness and distinctness of the Christian mode of life? 
This is a great question, and although I do not have the room to delve into 
it sufficiently here, I will discuss it briefly at the end of this essay. For now, 
allow the following to suffice: “The way in which Jesus Christ lives in open-
ness toward the Father and in this openness shows both the supreme exposure 
of the love of God and the supreme decision of man for God, can cause the 
metaphysician to ask himself whether he already thinks and enquires suffi-
ciently openly, or whether perhaps he has come too quickly to an end. It is 
in this sense that the Christian is called to be the guardian of metaphysics in 
our time” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. 5: The Realm 
of Metaphysics in The Modern Age [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989], 656).
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animal, and yet man cannot have an actual language unless he 
is brought into it. Man is rational—just as he is linguistic—by 
nature; he possesses the capacity to reason in the sense of having 
the potency to reason even if not actually reasoning. Recall the 
multifaceted distinction between the different senses of potential 
and actual made by Aristotle in De anima; it is no coincidence 
that he uses as his prime example the learning of language:
But we must now distinguish different senses in which 
things can be said to be potential or actual. . . . We can 
speak of something as a knower either as when we say that 
man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class 
of beings that know or have knowledge, or as when we are 
speaking of a man who possesses a knowledge of grammar; 
each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way: 
the one because his kind or matter is such and such, the 
other because he can reflect when he wants to, if nothing 
external prevents him. And there is the man who is already 
reflecting—he is a knower in actuality and in the most 
proper sense is knowing. . . . Both the former are potential 
knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the 
one by change of quality, i.e., repeated transitions from one 
state to its opposite under instruction, the other in another 
way by the transition from the inactive possession of sense 
or grammar to their active exercise.38
Is it natural for man to be grammatical? Yes, just as it is 
natural for an embryo at an early stage of development to be a 
perceiver with eyes, and yet this perceptual nature is present long 
before the baby has eyes. The baby needs the mother in order 
to develop properly so he can eventually become capable of, as 
Aristotle would put it, transitioning from the “inactive posses-
sion of sense . . . to the active exercise” of sight. Moreover, the 
fact that the child has a perceptual nature does not entail that the 
child can see all by himself. There is no such thing as pure perceptual 
nature. As Aristotle’s De anima clearly points out, seeing—active 
seeing—is a co-act between the perceiver and the perceived. In 
fact, Aristotle even thinks that one would not even have the ca-
pacity to see if there were not perceptible objects with which the 
sense organ can interact. Seeing is not simply something that I 
(or my eyes) do, but rather it is something I do with another. We 
38. Aristotle, De anima 417a22–b1.
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could even say, then, that seeing is itself rooted in a kind of grace. 
The perceiver realizes that something is given to him in seeing, 
something that he could never have come to on his own. The 
perceptible object—albeit unconsciously—graces itself (as “col-
ored,” Aristotle would say) to the perceiver. Finally, the perceiver 
must be actively receptive of perceptible objects if he is to see 
them. One could say in the poetic spirit of the Romantics that 
the opening of the eyes is an invitation for all of perceptible being 
to dwell within. But one must not forget that the eye does not 
force objects into itself; rather, it receives them.
The perceptual life, therefore, turns out to be a life of 
grace: one cannot see unless another reveals, giving himself to 
one; yet, it is the potential to receive the other that constitutes the 
perceptual nature. The oak tree outside my window is not (nor 
can be) open to receiving color as a perceptible object; it lacks a 
potential that humans possess in their very inner nature. Human 
beings are intrinsically disposed to receive color. But this does 
not mean we can actually receive color “purely naturally.” The 
act of seeing is an activity of the perceived object occurring in 
the sensing eye. Seeing requires something more than the seer. 
Moreover, it requires more than the seer being in the presence of 
a perceived object. No matter how long and hard I stare at a cof-
fee mug I cannot see it unless there is light. A significant part of 
book two of De anima concerns light as the underlying, external 
principle that must be present in order for the act of seeing to oc-
cur. Without going into the details of Aristotle’s account of per-
ception and the essential role played by light, we may infer from 
his presentation that seeing is not merely a gift of the mother to 
the developing embryo, nor is it merely the communication of 
the perceptible object to the mature perceiver, but it is also a gift 
of the light that makes sight actual. If it were not for the light 
shining in the darkness, there would be no hope of naturally see-
ing natural objects. In short, the light is what makes it possible for 
the being with a perceptual nature to act according to its nature. 
The light allows it to do what it is intrinsically disposed to do. It 
is also interesting to reflect on the fact that, for Aristotle, light 
is and must be actually transparent if active seeing of objects is 
to occur; otherwise we would see only light and not objects. In 
short, light does not displace the seeing nor the object seen but 
allows the two to interact according to their natures.
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I think something analogous must be said about why the 
life of active reason—the philosophical life—is at one and the 
same time a perfection of man’s nature and yet only actual by 
the grace of another. Just as the child’s perceptual nature would 
never have developed perfectly so as to see colors (although he 
could in the broadest sense of “potential” as we saw in Aristotle 
above) were it not for the in utero gift of his mother; so too the 
philosopher would never have developed a mind to “see” logos 
(although he could in a broad sense) were it not for the persis-
tent grace of his teacher who, as Aristotle said above, through 
“repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruc-
tion,” opens the pupil to exist in a more perfectly natural state. 
The object of sight—color—must come to the perceiver if the per-
ceiver is actually to see; likewise, the object of reason—logos—
must come to the reasoner if the reasoner is actually to know.
Finally, and most significantly, just as one does not actu-
ally see unless light is present, making the potentially seen actu-
ally seen; likewise, Aristotle argues (in De anima 3.5.430a15) that 
there must be “a sort of state, like light” that makes the potential-
ly knowable actually known by the knower. In short, just as the 
natural perceiver can stand in front of a yellow coffee mug with 
his eyes open and not see its color, so too the natural reasoner 
can stand in front of a geometrical theorem with his mind open 
and still not “see” its truth.39 The reason for this twofold lack of 
“sight” is the same: the person is standing in darkness. There is 
no light present. Without something like a light of reason that 
makes the potentially knowable actually known, so Aristotle ar-
gues, our rational nature would never attain its full actuality. 
Just as we are not entirely in control of the light of perception, 
so too we lack control of the light of reason. Therefore, actual 
perceiving and knowing are both the result of light being active 
and so allowing our nature (as perceptual and rational) to be fully 
actual. Light does not supplant the nature of reason but allows it 
to become actual—just as there is no competition between the 
eye, the object seen, and physical light, so too there is no com-
petition between reason and rational light. Just as the eye must 
be open to the receptivity of the perceptible object through the 
39. Those who have taught logic or geometry have likely experienced this 
many times firsthand during office hours.
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active showing of itself in light, so must the reasoner be open to 
the knowable object through the active showing of itself in light. 
If the light is not present, the natural self-communication of the 
being in question is thwarted and hence so is the natural recep-
tivity of that communication. Rational nature does not go out 
into the darkness trying to grasp truths and force them back into 
its own, self-generated light (its own rationalistic systems), but 
rather it actively prepares for the reception of the self-showing, 
self-communicating, and self-gracing object, the actual reception 
of which can occur only through the gift of that rational light.
It will surely be asked: What is this rational light? I can-
not explain what this light consists in; in fact, I am inclined to 
think that rational light must be an ineffable mystery because—
like all light—it is transparent. Light is that which shows forth 
something other than itself; what light could therefore illumine 
the light? I will only say this much, that what this rational light 
is, is best known experientially; for example, by those who are 
struck by a solution to a problem at two o’clock in the morning 
that they have grappled with for hours fruitlessly. Why does the 
solution come? Why then? No one can say. All we typically do 
is thank God that we were once blind but now we see and can 
go to bed.
Reason is most rational—and hence most natural—
when it is most perfectly open to the grace bestowed on it by the 
light of reason. Reason—like sight—is about preparing oneself 
to receive another, and, as we saw in the passage from Aristotle 
above, preparation or capacity can be spoken of at many different 
levels. All humans—including the misologist—have some capac-
ity to know the logos. This sense of capacity is analogous to the 
embryo’s capacity to see. The problem is that many misologists 
have thwarted their own natural development by cutting them-
selves off from logos, as one who cuts out his own eyes, making 
a potential seer incapable of actualizing that potential. By goug-
ing out his eyes, hating logos, he has forced himself to stand in 
darkness. As we will see below, there is always the possibility 
that the one who walks in darkness can see a great light; but this 
requires the con-descension of another. Balthasar has argued that 
the philosophical light is a life of love because it lives in the light 
of being.
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Every form of metaphysics, therefore, which withdraws the 
light of Being from man in order to locate the light in its 
entirety within his self ceases of itself to be metaphysics 
and becomes “science” [perhaps technology] which takes 
control of (manifest) existence. At the same time, Being 
and love are extinguished, for the philosophical act lives 
from both.40
As we have seen, language is an unmerited gift of one 
who has con-descended to communicate with the incommuni-
cable, to speak a language to the languageless. Such a person can 
be likened to the knower who, after leaving the cave, descends 
back into it, or goes back “down to the Piraeus.”41 Such a con-
descension verges on absurdity. Imagine a fully competent speak-
er of a language attempting to communicate with the incom-
municable. This is likely why many adults feel embarrassed when 
they try to speak to infants, because they know the infant does 
not understand a single word of what is said to him. However, 
something miraculous can happen when one con-descends to the 
infant. The child eventually finds himself a competent speaker. 
If humans did not do what is apparently absurd—i.e., speak to 
the languageless—the linguistic life would die. The same goes 
for the life of beauty and the life of logos. If lovers of beauty and 
logos cease to con-descend and pass on what was originally given 
to them, then such lives will come to an end. The death of the 
philo-logical life is the end of history. How does one hand on 
the philosophical life when those to whom the life is being intro-
duced stand outside it? Will they not necessarily find such a life 
unintelligible? Yes, at least initially. It is only through hope and 
love—and not through power and force—that one is introduced 
into the philosophical life. One cannot force the logos on any-
one any more than one can force education or love on another, 
anymore than one can force color into the eyes of a person who 
has chosen to close his eyes. The non serviam is a real possibility.
4. ΑἈΠΟ-ΛΟΓΊΑ : INCARNATING LOGOS
40. Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. 5, 645.
41. Republic 327a.
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In a famous exchange between Socrates and the young and eager 
Theaetetus, Socrates brings Theaetetus into a state of aporia (puz-
zlement or bewilderment). Despite the brevity of their exchange, 
it penetrates to the heart of the method of con-descension for 
the sake of intro-ducing one to—leading one into—the philo-
logical life.
Socrates:
I think you must be familiar with this kind of puzzle.
Theaetetus:
Oh yes; indeed, Socrates, I often wonder like mad what 
these things can mean; sometimes when I’m looking at 
them I begin to feel quite giddy.
Socrates:
I dare say you do, my boy. . . . For this is an experience 
which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: 
this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else. And 
the man who made Iris the child of Thaumas was 
perhaps no bad genealogist.42
Socrates is articulating something profound in referring 
to Iris (the bridge between the divine and the human) as the 
child of Thaumas (wonder). Socrates is asserting that wonder be-
gets communion with the divine; it carries us toward something 
beyond ourselves. Wonder is the way into philosophy—it is the 
only way one can be intro-duced to philosophy. Being perplexed 
by being can unlock the possibility for a more fervent openness 
and erotic entry into the mystery of being; it is this that pushes 
us toward the logos. Perplexity does not necessitate this open-
ness because one can experience perplexity from the standpoint 
of despair, and in this case it leads only to the absurdity and in-
coherence of being. The difference is that the lover experiences 
perplexity as intractable fullness whereas one prone to despair 
experiences perplexity as ineffable emptiness. Socrates brings his 
fellow Athenians face to face with the possibility of entering into 
the philosophical life by inducing aporia in them. However, that 
aporia gives rise to wonder only if one embraces aporia with hu-
mility and meekness—that is, with love. Doing so opens the in-
dividual to something more than a puzzle or problem. Through 
humility, aporia is transfigured into a mystery sought in love, 
42. Plato, Theaetetus 155c–d.
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rather than a problem dealt with through power.43 Only the phi-
losopher—in his humility—can experience aporia as a mystery 
giving rise to a truth that surpasses all understanding. However, 
it was precisely this Socratic humility in aporia that appeared so 
pathetic and perverse to Callicles and the Athenian jury.
Plato was fully aware that wonder cannot be forced upon 
someone. It is the fruit of rational freedom. Moreover, wonder 
is not the same as mere confusion. Wonder is dynamic. It is te-
leological. Unless one’s opinion is shaken to its roots, one will 
remain deaf—as Heraclitus has said—since all one has heard is 
his own ignorance.44
Pride is the cause of deafness just as it was the cause of 
blindness.45 For it takes a radical openness—i.e., wonder—to 
hear something outside of oneself; moreover, this openness it-
self comes from outside. Only something “outside” oneself can 
occasion wonder. The greatest cause of wonder for a creature is 
his very act of existence itself, and one can truly wonder at his 
own existence—ask the question of being—only if he finds his 
very act of being as a gift or grace from another. In short, one 
can truly wonder at one’s own life only once one sees it as a 
gift from another. This implies that wonder—the essence of the 
philosophical life—is a grace: a gift from another.
Socrates recognizes his own wonder not only as a gift 
received from God, but also as a gift that is given to Athens. 
Socrates has con-descended to his Athenians (he went down to 
the Piraeus).46 His con-descension—his gift to Athens—was his 
very philo-logical life (to the extent that it cost him his biological 
life). His life was an apo-logia. He showed Athens something that 
cannot be perfectly stated, namely the philo-logical life. At the 
same time, he tried to communicate that life in speech as much 
as possible, for it was through this dialogical attempt to speak the 
unspeakable that he showed them what it means to be oriented 
43. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, “On the Ontological Mystery,” in The Philosophy of 
Existence (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2018).
44. Heraclitus, quoted by Clement, Miscellanies 5.115.3, cited in Robin Wa-
terfield, The First Philosophers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 38.
45. Cf. Jn 9:39.
46. Republic 327a.
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toward and to love the logos. His loving attempts to speak the 
unspeakable (i.e., the forms, the essential truth of things) was his 
way of showing the philo-logical life. He saw his life as origi-
nating in a gift received, and hence he saw his life’s fulfillment 
in being a gift for others. Socrates’s life was fulfilled in being a 
sincere gift of self.47
Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you 
will not harm me more than yourselves. . . . Indeed, 
men of Athens, I am far from making a defense on my 
behalf, as might be thought, but on yours, to prevent you 
from wrongdoing by mistreating the god’s gift to you by 
condemning me; for if you kill me you will not easily find 
another like me. I was attached to this city by the god—
though it seems a ridiculous thing to say—as upon a great 
and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of 
its size and needed to be stirred by a kind of gadfly. It is to 
fulfill such a function that I believe the god has placed me 
in the city.48
Socrates is stating that the way to bring people into the 
life of logos—into the life of reason—is to “stir them” by “bit-
ing them” with logos, arguments, and reason, which culminates 
in aporia. The vast majority of those “bitten” by Socrates are 
not receptive to the good that this bite carries, and so they are 
not induced to wonder. However, the impossible is possible: one 
who is not linguistic can receive the logos. Even Socrates himself 
recognizes that this sounds absurd (“though it seems a ridiculous 
thing to say”). He is fully aware that most will not understand 
his apology because his apology is his life—and yet he presents 
it nonetheless.
Another such man will not easily come to be among you, 
gentlemen, and if you believe me you will spare me. You 
might easily be annoyed with me as people are when they 
are aroused from a doze, and strike out at me; if convinced 
by Anytus you could easily kill me, and then you could 
sleep on for the rest of your days, unless the god, in his 
care for you, sent you someone else. That I am the kind of 
person to be a gift of the god to the city you might realize 
47. See Gaudium et spes, 24.
48. Apology 30d.
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from the fact that it does not seem like human nature 
for me to have neglected all my own affairs and to have 
tolerated this neglect now for so many years while I was 
always concerned with you, approaching each one of you 
like a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for 
virtue.49
Lastly, it is important to note the miracle that occurred 
at Socrates’s trial. The apparently impossible was actualized. Af-
ter having been found guilty, Socrates notes his surprise at the 
number of votes cast in his favor, or rather in favor of the philo-
logical life: “I am much more surprised at the number of votes 
cast on each side, for I did not think the decision would be by so 
few votes but by a great many.”50 Socrates even con-descended 
to his accusers one last time to reveal the reason for living the 
philosophical life to them. The majority continued to remain 
deaf to the logos, but to his astonishment, some actually heard 
his apology, and, like children, found themselves understanding 
his life.51
Let us now end by turning to consider the metadialogi-
cal nature of Plato’s dialogues referenced above. In writing his 
dialogues, Plato appears to have crafted them in such a way that, 
when one reads them, one is brought into the conversation as a 
participant and not a mere observer. The Platonic dialogues are 
captivating. One is drawn into them, finding oneself transfigured 
from a mere observer into an interlocutor. The philosophical re-
percussions of this are eternal.
Through the medium of the Socratic dialogue, Plato 
has reincarnated the late Socrates. Socrates’s confidence that he 
would survive death was rooted in his confidence in his prog-
eny—Plato, Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Crito, and so forth—who 
have shared in his life. His philo-logical life will carry on after 
49. Apology 31a–b.
50. Apology 36a.
51. Ironically, according to Diogenes Laërtius’s “Apology of Socrates” (in 
his The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library 
184 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925]), there were more jurymen 
who voted to kill Socrates than there were to acquit him; therefore, there 
were some jurymen who thought that he was innocent and that he should be 
put to death.
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his death; indeed, his death only reinforces the survival of the 
philo-logical life.
Plato has made present to us the gadfly of Athens. We 
encounter, through the Platonic dialogue, the grace of the apo-
logia, which awakens in us a love of logos. What Plato’s dialogues 
have accomplished is truly life-changing. Plato has reincarnated 
the philosophical life, but not through any mere description of 
such a life. For mere descriptions of lives are static and dead. 
Plato’s dialogues are not ultimately about Socrates’s pursuit of the 
logos of some particular form (knowledge, justice, beauty, be-
ing, etc.) with an interlocutor. To interpret them thus would be 
to read the dialogues merely descriptively, and hence to assume 
they have a static nature. Rather, Plato’s dialogues have a perfor-
mative and dynamic nature. They are presenting something—a 
kind of life—to the reader. Therefore, the Platonic dialogue is 
essentially metadialogical. It does not leave the reader outside as a 
neutral observer; rather, the written Platonic dialogue transcends 
its written nature.
Socrates:
It is a discourse that is written down, with knowledge, 
in the soul of the listener; it can defend itself, and it 
knows for whom it should speak and for whom it 
should remain silent.
Phaedrus:
You mean the living, breathing discourse of the man 




The reader, at first unawares, finds himself engaged in his own 
dialogue with the text. The aim of the Platonic dialogue is to 
transform the reader into an interlocutor. It achieves its end when 
the reader becomes a lover.
I will conclude by examining one of the most impor-
tant theological implications of being intro-duced to philoso-
phy. Only the one who has been intro-duced to philosophy (in 
the sense of being led into a life of love of logos), rather than 
simply being trained in the academic discipline, can have the 
52. Phaedrus 276a–b.
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radical openness necessary for encountering the Incarnation of 
the Logos in the person of Jesus Christ. An orthodox theology 
requires this preparatory radical opening—otherwise, one will 
be tempted to force the Logos into a preconceived system. Those 
who have not been intro-duced to philosophy will mistakenly 
think that the point of theology is to view Christ as a series of 
problems to be solved with a will-to-conceptual-power, rather 
than as a mystery to be loved. The philosopher is the only one 
capable of being transfigured into a theologian, for philosophy in 
one sense perfects and in another sense is perfected by theology; 
and any attempt to reduce the one to the other or to divorce the 
one from the other entirely destroys them both.
The meaning of language is that it communicates some-
thing beyond itself. Words signify reality. But, if one thought of 
words as void of the reality that they signify, then no communica-
tion could occur. Therefore, the word is by nature paradoxical—
its meaning is intrinsic to itself, but only as transcending itself. 
If one over-emphasized either side of this paradox (the intrinsic 
meaning or the transcendent meaning), then the word would 
not be communicative and hence meaningful. Language ceases 
to be communicative when it fails to transcend itself: sounds are 
meaningful only when they are more than sounds, precisely as 
sounds. In light of this, we can understand the Incarnate Logos’s 
teaching about himself as the spoken word of the Father: “And he 
who sees me sees him who sent me” ( Jn 12:45).
Many readers (perhaps more likely, “excerpters” or “cit-
ers”) of Plato fall into the modern temptation to attribute to 
Plato a form of nihilism about the incarnate word. Many believe 
that he takes the physical world as void of meaning. They attri-
bute to him—following Nietzsche’s interpretation53—the view 
that the philosopher’s goal is to transcend the meaninglessness of 
the physical world of mere sound and to ascend to the meaning-
ful world of abstracted language. However, this attribution of in-
carnational nihilism is a grave philosophical mistake and misin-
terpretation of Plato. The physical world is not void of meaning, 
any more than it is void of being or goodness. If it were, then the 
53. See especially Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Twilight of the Idols, in 
The Nietzsche Reader; although this attribution of nihilism to Plato is prevalent 
throughout Nietzsche’s entire career.
ET VERBUM CARO FACTUM EST 33
philosophical life could not be passed on. In short, Plato’s Apol-
ogy—the Socratic apo-logia—would be senseless. Moreover, if the 
physical world were void of meaning, then, according to Plato, it 
would run contrary to the nature of Goodness itself.
Now why did he who framed this whole universe of 
becoming [the physical, tangible universe] frame it? Let us 
state the reason why: He was good, and one who is good 
can never become jealous of anything. And so, being free 
of jealousy, he wanted everything to become as much like 
himself as was possible. . . . The god wanted everything to 
be good and nothing to be bad so far as that was possible, 
and so he took over all that was visible—not at rest but in 
discordant and disorderly motion—and brought it from a 
state of disorder to one of order, because he believed that 
order was in every way better than disorder.54
Nothing could be further from the truth than the as-
sertion that the physical world is disordered, meaningless, un-
informed, or nihilistic; To say so amounts to asserting that the 
Good is jealous, and hence not the Good. Only a misologist (de-
spiser of the Good) sees the physical world nihilistically. So why 
do so many “readers” of Plato attribute this nihilism to him? 
D.C. Schindler has argued that many are tempted to read Plato 
as a proto-Cartesian, and are thereby led to think that Descartes’s 
ethical, theological, metaphysical, historical, and scientific con-
cerns were those of Plato.55 They implicitly hold that in order to 
understand Plato one must begin with Descartes, who offers a 
more explicit (because nondramatic) defense of the same theses 
as Plato. They presuppose a certain cosmology and metaphys-
ics that originates in late Scholasticism and the early modernism 
that leaves no room for the diffusiveness of the Good. To put this 
differently, they fail to understand that at the heart of a Platonic 
cosmology is the metaphysically serious yet poetically rich thesis 
that the Good itself is so free of jealousy that it even descends into 
the physical world to inform that otherwise meaningless world of 
becoming. It does not just bring meaning out of becoming, but it 
brings meaning (order) to and in becoming precisely as becom-
54. Timaeus 29e–30b.
55. See D.C. Schindler, The Catholicity of Reason (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2013), 120–29.
ANDREW J. JAEGER34
ing. Without the Good, there would be no becoming. In other 
words, becoming is the incarnating of being.
The spoken word as spoken—because of the Good—is 
made meaningful. To think that spoken words are nothing but 
mere meaningless sounds is to be forgetful of the Good. The 
world of flesh is a world saturated with meaning; however, one 
must not confuse this saturation with the equally true fact that 
the world of flesh is also confusing. How can the world of be-
coming be? How can that-which-is-not share in that-which-is? 
How can noises communicate something more than noises? The 
incarnation of meaning, which is the creative work of the de-
miurge, is far from meaningless: it is wonder-filled because it 
is beautiful. It is precisely as both incarnate and meaning ful that 
the created world exceeds our ability to grasp it. Only the phi-
losopher can recognize creation for what it is: the paradox of 
paradoxes, the union of being and becoming. Creation is the in-
carnation of logos, and so only a lover of creation can understand 
it and through understanding also participate in it. The lover of 
logos (the philosopher) is the only one able to avoid nihilism, for 
he is the only one who is open to seeing being in the becoming. 
Or, more accurately, the philosopher—as a lover—is the only 
one capable of seeing the incarnation of logos, even though it is 
only in faith, through Christ who reveals man to himself, that he 
is brought to actual fullness. The pagan philosopher lives Advent; 
the Christian philosopher lives Christmas.56                            
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